In Defense of Regime Change
Regime change has gotten a bad rap, but it is the right geopolitical strategy for the moment.
Much of the energy on foreign policy matters has rightfully been directed at the biggest challenge America faces in the 21st century, as well as its close ally, the major nuclear power currently trying to swallow up its smaller neighbor. China and Russia are indeed the most powerful foes that the United States must deal with on the world stage, but they are not the only ones. There are several weaker powers, ranging from nuclear states to relatively minor semi-regional players, that are, alongside the big dogs, arrayed against us and antagonistic to our interests. Unlike their bigger friends, these countries are extremely susceptible to American pressure to remove them as a threat. America would be far better off if the governments of these nations were to no longer be hostile to us – an outcome that we could work to bring about. Yes, that means a policy of regime change.
Regime change as an idea has gotten a bad rap given the events of the Iraq War and its regional aftermath, but it is undeserved. To be sure, that particular instance of a regime change war was indeed controversial and may have done far more harm than good, depending on who you ask. But not all regime change policies must end in full-scale armed conflict and occupation. Indeed, they may not even require the direct application of force at all. These policies are not out of line with historic geopolitics, either in the global context or the distinctly American one. The British Empire of the 19th century pushed for changes in government at various times outside of Europe, including in Africa, Central Asia, and the Americas; many of these pressure campaigns involved gunboat diplomacy, but rarely led to long-term occupation. The United States has historically involved itself quite heavily in regime change policies in Latin America, with operations in both Grenada and Panama within the last half century.
As a geostrategic concept, regime change is sound. Some foreign governments are bad moral actors, impossible to work with in good faith, or hostile to our interests and our allies. These are not regimes with which we should seek comity and we should not deceive ourselves about our ultimate goal: change in the people in charge. Sugarcoating this objective reality is counterproductive and unnecessarily limits our policy choices. As the primary world power, America should want a strong, forward-oriented foreign policy so as to deter bad actors and end international threats before they can metastasize. The situational nature of this policy is crucial to its success. Changing the regimes in Russia and China would be ideal, but their relative power and strength – as well as their sizable nuclear arsenals – make engaging in such a policy imprudent and contrary to our most paramount objectives with respect to them: containment and deterrence. When it comes to weaker regimes, however, the calculus shifts dramatically.
America should not shy away from a forward policy against these more minor adversaries, as we have far less to fear from them individually. Removing these enemy states from the playing field in advance of a major conflict not only would aid us in handling that broader war, but it would also contribute to its deterrence. If our more powerful enemies are shorn of their allied satrapies, they are less able to expand a conflict against us in a manner that distracts from the core issue at hand. These smaller enemy nations still pose a threat to American interests, even if far less significant than their bigger partners; we should not be content with allowing them to remain in power to act on those threats. Depending on the regime in question, their deposition and replacement could also bring significant domestic US benefits as well. For instance, engaging in regime change in certain Latin American countries could help reduce the problems of drug smuggling, transnational criminal gangs, and illegal immigration that these regimes incentivize and support.
The key is carrying out this policy without sparking an actual war with an Iraq-style occupation afterwards. Critics of the whole idea of regime change deny that this is possible, but there are plenty of tools in the American policy toolkit with which to undermine weaker foes. Not all tactics work equally well for all targets, but the options are myriad and run the gamut from economic and diplomatic actions to targeted military strikes and support for internal resistance movements.
The first step in any regime change strategy should be diplomatic and rhetorical. Without explaining to the American public and the international community the necessity of such a strategy and the evils of the targeted regime, there will be no potential for buy-in. Leadership in Washington should make these explanations a regular feature of public appearances. Hammering the need for regime change will lay the groundwork for the tactics that follow. Additionally, we should be sure to press our case in international institutions and regional bodies – especially when it comes to the Western Hemisphere – both to isolate the target regime and try to build something of a consensus on the issue. We should use all of the diplomatic carrots and sticks that we have to bring other nations to our side and marginalize the target regime.
On the economic front, Washington has an extremely strong hand to play. It can exert maximum pressure on adversarial regimes through powerful financial sanctions, including secondary sanctions applied to third parties who consort with the targeted regime. Cutting off as many external funding sources is critical and should be done wherever possible, including limiting trade, market access, and even the ability to work within the global financial system. Getting broader buy-in among allies for the policy would only increase the pressure on the target regime, causing internal disruptions and stress on the regime from below. As the citizenry of the targeted nation see their own wealth declining based exclusively on the actions of their government, domestic pressure only grows.
Supporting that resistance is another important aspect of this policy. Without potential alternatives, even if imperfect, or a restive populace willing to accept a different government, a regime change strategy is doomed to fail. In many cases, an organized opposition already exists and is being suppressed by the leaders in charge, particularly if the regime still clings to the pretense of electoral politics. The goal of a regime change policy should not be to immediately stand up an American-style representative democracy, but to replace the current leadership with one that is more aligned with our interests. Direct aid for internal dissident movements should be covert so as to not give the regime an easy way to delegitimize them, but rhetorical support can and should be overt and uncompromising. In the past, we have recognized and supported alternate governments, either during wartime or as a result of occupation. This would follow along that well-trodden diplomatic path.
A strong regime change policy may have military elements, but still fall short of war. America should project strength against the targeted regime, hoping to deter it from belligerence against our friends and interests. If deterrence fails, however, we must be prepared to respond quickly and disproportionately to forestall further enemy action and punish the aggressors. Similar strikes can be targeted at specific regime issues or weak points, either to neuter capabilities, support opposition resistance, or eliminate bad actors. An example of the first case would be strikes on regime nuclear infrastructure, as the Israelis did in both Syria and Iraq. The second tactic was evinced by the Trump administration recently, as they helped Venezuelan opposition figures abscond from the country. The last was used very successfully by the first Trump administration in its targeted killing of the Iranian terror commander Qassem Soleimani after a number of Iranian regional attacks. None of these options involves a full-scale war, but play a broader part in a grander scheme towards regime change.
Alliances and regional partnerships are a major force multiplier when it comes to regime change policy. The more partners we can integrate into our strategy, the more effective it becomes. America should ensure that we do not alienate our friends in the process, however. In the case of regime change policy, that means not pushing every single partner to engage in every single strategy equally. America should focus its efforts first on those nations immediately impacted by the targeted regime: its neighbors. The circle should expand out from there to other relevant allies and fellow Western democracies based on our shared interests. Trying to bring all partners into all strategies would be deleterious to our individual relationships and expend too much necessary political capital that is required elsewhere. Playing a strong hand matters, but not overplaying it matters more.
America has the ability to utilize any of these tactics in a regime change strategy. In fact, we may very well be uniquely well-suited to do so. And we have no lack of potential targets, from more serious and far-flung threats like North Korea and Iran to a cadre of Western Hemisphere adversaries including Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The tactics for each situation would differ wildly, but there is the potential for success in the medium to long-term for all of them. We needn’t shy away from regime change policies when they are accessible and possible, either as targeted ends in and of themselves or as means to the end of weakening the broader coalition that we face. As the ancient Romans knew, if one desires peace, one must prepare for war. And the best preparation for that conflict is deterring it by undermining the enemy coalition, while removing immediate dangers along the way. A targeted, measured regime change strategy is the way to achieve this outcome.
Let’s leave the mistakes of the past behind and stop thinking of regime change as a bad word. It very well could be the path to making the 21st century a decidedly American one.