A Third Option for Iran

The U.S. has been stuck in a cycle of conflict and negotiation. Here's how to break out of it.

I am absolutely stoked to be making my debut in the online pages of a publication I’ve admired since its founding, The Dispatch. In this essay, I explore a new path for victory against the mullahcracy. I lay out the current situation with Iran, in which Washington has veered repeatedly between the extreme poles of all-out belligerence and capitulatory diplomacy - sometimes in the same day, sometimes even in the same Trump social media rant - and explore the issues with each. But these are not the only two options when it comes to the war. The third path, focused on maximum economic pressure, a full blockade, and military operations to retaliate against Iran and escort ships through the Strait of Hormuz, is the best bet to achieve a durable, long-term victory for American interests. I explain how this could be implemented, the challenges it may face, and why it should be the focus of our policy going forward.

Below is an excerpt, but the whole essay can be read here.

So, if a deal with Iran is doomed and the president does not have the stomach to do what it takes to achieve complete military victory, how does the United States extricate itself from this conflict? The answer is simple, if uncomfortable: Embrace ambiguity and step back.

This approach avoids many of the traps that could present themselves—and very much already have—in the dealmaking and enforcement process, as well as a potential return to all-out war. Instead of trying to come to an understanding with a counterparty that is uninterested in implementing or following any agreement, America should bank its tangible military victories, continue to apply maximum economic pressure, and maintain its freedom of action to strike kinetically once again if the opportunity arises.

This approach would allow the U.S. to avoid granting unnecessary and counterproductive concessions to an enemy regime that has not, contrary to the Trump administration’s talking points, become more moderate and rational since February. America would not gain any of the supposed concessions granted by Tehran, but as detailed earlier, those are highly unlikely to ever materialize anyway.

Stepping back does not mean leaving the region entirely, nor does it mean allowing Iran to consolidate its forces and continue its regional aggression. It means sustained cessation of the fast-paced shock-and-awe approach of the first month of the war but also a continuation of the maritime blockade, an effort to avoid total Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and the maintenance of the maximum pressure strategy the administration calls Operation Economic Fury. There are many good reasons to slow or halt the bombing campaign, from munitions issues to a relative paucity of targets due to our immense original success. We could use a break in the bombardment to reestablish our reserves of weaponry, set up improved defensive networks, and increase our readiness for crises elsewhere in the world.

The regime remains in a very bad position: Iran’s economy is wrecked, its proxies are on the run, its leadership cadre has been decimated, and its defense industrial base has been largely obliterated. It has no real navy and no operational air force, lacks control over its own airspace, and is rapidly burning through its cash reserves. Continuing the non-kinetic pressure campaign through enhanced sanctions, partnerships with Gulf states, targeted actions against Iranian banks and individuals, and a full-scale maritime blockade of Iranian export facilities would keep the Islamic Republic on the back foot and avoid giving them the breathing room that constant negotiations and temporary agreements would.

Such a strategy would require less of an active military presence, as it could rely on our regional partners for assistance, whether Israel or the Gulf states. It would preserve our freedom of action and that of our allies, allowing us to resume heavier strikes on Iran if necessary to prevent the reconstitution of the nuclear or ballistic missile programs, or as retaliation for Iranian attacks. The option to resume active combat would help us lock in our existing military successes, whereas a deal with Iran only constrains our ability to prevent Iranian recovery. It would also allow Israel to keep up the successful assault against Hezbollah in Lebanon, further degrading that Iranian proxy and opening up a brighter future for the Lebanese people. The option for increased military use is present through potential escort missions for ships seeking to transit the strait or freedom-of-navigation maneuvers to protect sea lanes, both of which would achieve one of the administration’s tacit goals: calming international energy markets.

This plan would constitute a relative climb down from the intense bombardment of March, but it would still execute the same broader strategy of weakening, destabilizing, and containing the Islamic Republic. Continuing the broader push against Iran would also quell the nerves of our regional partners and help solidify a more durable anti-Iran coalition. And the potential impact of full-scale American economic warfare is significant. According to estimates, Iran was losing upward of $435 million a day from the U.S. blockade, adding to hundreds of billions in damage from the kinetic operations that predated it. This constitutes a sizable proportion of Iran’s prewar GDP, and maintaining the blockade would starve the regime of the revenue it could use to recover.

Maintaining American economic pressure and allowing the blockade and enhanced sanctions to bite would make it incredibly challenging for the regime to survive. This does not require a deal with Tehran. On the contrary, a deal lessens our leverage over the Islamic Republic.